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In today’s increasingly connected world, it is 
more important than ever to ensure an organization’s 
information and information systems are protected 
from cyber threats.  Every organization has critical 
information and technology assets that are essential 
to their business operations and require enhanced 
security.  Organizational resources that can be 
dedicated to cybersecurity are finite; therefore, those 
resources should be applied deliberately and 
strategically focusing on the most important assets.  
While large cities, states and corporations, with 
robust IT capabilities, may be able to align their 
processes with federally mandated directives to 
identify those critical assets also deemed high value 
assets, the smaller government agencies and small to 
mid-sized organizations require a scalable and 
flexible process based on their individual 
requirements.  This paper will describe a method for 
identifying high value assets that can be integrated 




1. Introduction  
 
The cyber security landscape has changed from 
the “script kiddies” of a few years ago to the well-
organized professional actors of today.  The script 
kiddies were most interested in displaying their skills 
and accomplishments by hacking into a business firm 
or a government agency and then bragging about 
their accomplishments.   The actors of today 
represent professional hacking groups and or nation 
states that have goals of political turmoil or financial 
gain.  For example, China and Russia have been the 
leading cyber security bad actors for the last 15 years.  
Research conducted from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies examined publicly available 
data on cyber-espionage and cyberwar focused on 
cyber-attacks on government agencies, defense and 
high tech companies or economic crimes with losses 
of more than a million dollars.  The study reveals 
from 2006 to 2018, China was involved in 108 cyber 
incidents with losses of more than $1 million each. 
Russia has been responsible for 98 major cyber 
incidents with losses of more than $1 million each. 
Next in the ranking came Iran with 44 incidents, and 
North Korea with 38. India was listed as guilty of 16 
important cyber incidents from 2006 to 2018, while 
the U.S. was accused of nine. The rest of the world 
had 67 incidents [1].  According to Cybersecurity 
Ventures, the damage related to cybercrime is 
projected to hit $6 trillion annually by 2021 and 
cyber security spending is expected to exceed $1 
trillion. 
Much of the increase in hacking is because of the 
advances in technology in the areas of software 
development and communications.  The capabilities 
of the software that is used in the hacking has 
become more sophisticated and more available on the 
Internet.  The AV-TEST Institute has identified an 
average of 12 million new malware routines each 
month for the last year.  Each of these malware 
routines has variants and thus compounds the 
difficulty in defending the cyber systems.  The basic 
ransomware platform that was used in the recent 
pipeline and meatpacking exploits is available for 
purchase on line.  Open source software tools provide 
the arsenal for the nation states and other gangs to 
threaten the extortion of business and government 
entities [2].  Many of the tools are updated regularly 
so that they remain effective to changes in the cyber 
security landscape.  Cybersecurity Ventures estimates 
that ransomware attacks a business every 14 seconds.  
According to the Accenture Report “The biggest 
takeaway from our research is that organizations 
should expect cybercriminals to become more brazen 
as the potential opportunities and pay-outs from these 
campaigns climb to the stratosphere.”  Ransomware 
has become the new business model for cyber 
criminals. 
Ransomware has several methods for achieving 
the desired result.  All lead to extortion or loss for 
business systems.  The malware may be used to steal 
data such as financial information that can be sold on 





the black market or used for identity theft.  Software 
is frequently used to encrypt data files that can be 
returned to normal only after a ransom is paid and an 
encryption key is provided.    The data threat may be 
to make confidential data public, embarrassing 
someone in particular, which could become a 
political situation.  It may be used to steal credentials 
that can be used to sign on to other systems.  
Frequently, the malware is used to attack the business 
systems.  However, attacks can also be targeted to 
industrial control systems such as the electric grid or 
a petroleum distillation tower.  Regardless of the 
target, they all have the same message; pay or suffer 
the consequences. 
With the current computing and communication 
technology, it is not possible to have a system that 
cannot be hacked.  Systems have to be designed so 
that they are resilient and important functional assets 
are well protected.  This protection process begins 
with determining the value of system components 
and functions. 
High Value Assets (HVAs) is the term that 
describes critical assets that support a community’s 
or organization’s mission or critical operations, 
including critical information that is processed, 
stored, or transmitted.  These assets, systems, and 
datasets may contain sensitive controls, or data 
making them of high interest to criminal, politically 
motivated or state-sponsored actors.  These malicious 
actors may be particularly interested in targeting 
these assets for direct exploitation of data or to cause 
a loss of confidence by the public. Adapting a 
strategy to assist a community and the organizations 
within it to identify and prioritize high value assets 
will enable them to dedicate people and financial 
resources to those assets ensuring better security and 
resiliency of HVAs. 
 
2. Traditional Methods to Value Assets 
 
Organizations have been using valuation methods 
since the early 1900’s to determine the value of the 
business.  In the 1960’s valuating assets emerged to 
improve business decisions.  Asset valuation is a 
process to determine the value of tangible and 
intangible assets.  Common methods of asset 
valuation include the Cost Method, Market Value 
Method and Standard Cost Method [3].   The cost 
method is based on the value of the historical price 
when the asset was purchased.  This method is used 
to recognize the asset in inventory and fixed asset 
accounting.  The market value method is based on the 
value of the asset on the market or the projected price 
when sold.  This method is helpful when determining 
a replacement value for an insured asset.  The third 
common method used is the standard cost method 
which uses expected costs instead of actual costs.  
This method is done by obtaining the recording 
differences between expected and actual costs.  The 
standard cost method is generally used to measure 
cost control and performance to assist in determining 
profit margins based on projected costs [4]. There are 
many reasons to value organizational assets such as 
identifying the right price for an asset to ensure the 
organization does not overpay; to determine the value 
of the business; to determine collateral when a 
company applies for a loan; and verifying the value 
of assets as part of an audit.  While each of these 
methods have useful purposes, none of them have a 
risk management approach that would apply to 
cybersecurity.  
 
3. Federal Directives and HVA Approach  
 
The Federal HVA Program initiative was 
established in 2015 through a directive from the 
Office of Management and Budgets (OMB).  OMB 
Memorandum M-16-04, Cybersecurity Strategy and 
Implementation Plan (CSIP) directs the Federal 
Civilian Government to strengthen their 
cybersecurity through five objectives.  One of the 
objectives requires agencies to have prioritized 
identification and protection of high value 
information and assets, resulting in the HVA 
Program [5].  
December 2016, OMB Memorandum M-17-09 
defines HVA in a single definition and is updated in 
December 2018 through OMB Memorandum M-19-
03 to provide flexibility by adding multiple 
categories under which an agency may designate an 
HVA.  The categories defined for identifying critical 
assets are: 
• Informational Value – the information or 
information system that processes, stores, or 
transmits the information is of high value to the 
government or its adversaries 
• Mission Essential – the agency that owns the 
information or information system cannot 
accomplish its Primary Mission Essential 
Functions (PMEFs) as approved in accordance 
with PPD-40 National Continuity Policy, within 
expected timelines without the information or 
information system 
• Federal Civilian Enterprise Essential (FCEE) – 
the information or information system serves a 
critical function in maintaining the security and 
resilience of the federal civilian enterprise. 
Federal Information Processing Standards 
Publication 199 (FIPS PUB 199), February 2004, 
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defines the security categories for both information 
and information systems and defines three levels of 
potential impact (low, moderate, high) on 
organizations or individuals if a security breach were 
to occur [6].  The context of the impact must take 
place within the organization and pertains to the 
overall national interest.  The potential impacts are 
defined as follows: 
• Low – the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability could be expected to have a limited 
adverse effect on organizational operations, 
organizational assets, or individuals. 
• Moderate – the loss of confidentiality, integrity, 
or availability could be expected to have a 
serious adverse effect on organizational 
operations, operational assets, or individuals. 
• High – the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability could be expected to have a severe or 
catastrophic adverse effect on organizational 
operations, organizational assets, or individuals.  
The federal directives are focused on national 
security to include protecting national resources, the 
economy, citizens and institutions.  The established 
Federal HVA Program cannot be applied directly to 
non-federal organizations. Although, many of the 
directives could be used as guiding principles for a 
HVA program, a new program must be developed 
that is flexible and scalable enough to be 
implemented by State, Local, Tribe and Territory 
(SLTT) jurisdictions based on their individual 
requirements and can be modeled from the Federal 
Government’s HVA Program.  Additionally, small to 
mid-sized organizations would also benefit and could 
use this modified approach.  
 
4. HVA Model Criteria 
 
The development and implementation of a model 
will provide a step by step approach allowing all 
organizations no matter their size, extent of their 
resources or maturity in cybersecurity to improve 
their efforts to identify and protect high value assets 
critical to the organization.  Defining the state of the 
organizations that will use this model is needed to 
identify areas of consideration to establish criteria to 
craft the model. 
 
4.1 Defining the SLTT Landscape 
 
Research conducted to establish criteria included 
gathering and reviewing documentation describing 
the SLTT landscape and interviews with SLTT 
organizations. The purpose of the research was to 
gather information regarding Information 
Technology (IT) capabilities associated with HVAs, 
to identify terminology, tools, best practices and 
lessons learned that may exist.  
Research documentation included published 
reports, studies, articles, and reviews focused on the 
SLTT landscape associated with IT capabilities and 
resources, asset management practices, risk 
management processes and other characteristics that 
support an overall understanding of SLTT 
capabilities. The documents included in this review 
are as follows: 
• 2020 Deloitte-National Association of State 
Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) Cyber 
Security study  
• Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) 
2019 published by the Multi State-
Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(MS-ISAC) 
• 2020 National Preparedness Report published 
by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) 
• 2019 National Preparedness Report published 
by DHS 
• Cybersecurity 2016 Survey by the 
International City/County Management 
Association (ICMA) 
Eight interviews were conducted from November 
2020 – February 2021. The interviews were a mix of 
state, local and critical infrastructure entities. The 
organizations interviewed also represented urban and 
rural localities. The backgrounds of the interviewees 
were both technical and non-technical.  
The SLTT ecosystem includes or may 
encompass State, Local, Tribe and Territory 
governments, as well as critical infrastructure and 
industry partners, which include small businesses, 
public-private partnerships, and other entities.  Other 
entities include organizations such as independent 
school districts (ISDs), community colleges, or 
universities.    
Many SLTT entities are interconnected and there 
is a growing concern that cyber-attacks targeting 
smaller public entities put state assets at risk. A 
2020 Deloitte-NASCIO Cyber Security study found 
that “smaller public entities—such as counties, cities, 
towns, and educational institutions—may be 
particularly vulnerable ... 40% of Chief Information 
Security Officers (CISOs) said they feel only 
somewhat confident that their state assets are 
adequately protected from cyberattacks targeting 
local government.” [7] 
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4.2 Governance Structures 
 
SLTT governance structures broadly fall into 
three categories: centralized, decentralized, and 
hybrid structures as shown in Figure 1. These 
structures may vary even within a particular SLTT 
entity. In a 2019 survey of SLTT entities, over 95% 
of states and 75% of localities identified as having 
















Figure 1. Governance Structures, 2019 
Nationwide Cybersecurity Summary Report 
 
Interviewed cities and states having decentralized and 
hybrid governance structures expressed one of the 
challenges they encounter is that there are some 
stakeholders who would need to voluntarily 
participate in certain initiatives such as an HVA 
program.  As an example, the mayor of a city may 
not have direct authority over some county officials 
to discuss IT assets.  At the state level, each agency 
assesses and implements their own asset management 
practices and are not required to report high value 
assets to the state.   
 
Criteria Observation #1 – the model must include 
guidance or an introduction that explains why an 
HVA Program is important and how it can assist any 
community to improve their cybersecurity posture by 





Resources refer to the people, money, and existing 
assets of an organization. The resources available and 
allocated by SLTTs varies widely.  Through the 
interviews, each organization reinforced resources 
are limited.  The IT, security and risk management 
capabilities varied tremendously across the 
interviewed organizations. The range spanned from 
one rural organization having no IT capabilities to 
states with considerably more resources but still not 
enough to do everything they would like to do.  
Various reports describe IT and security 
capabilities in the SLTT community. The 2019 
Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) utilizes a 
maturity scale that assesses how an organization is 
addressing the different activities within the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). According to the 
report, larger organizations have a greater IT 
capability and tend to score higher when 
implementing the NIST CSF.  Figure 2 states that 
organizations with 25 or more IT employees score 
19%, however the chart also shows that only 22% of 

















Figure 2. IT Full-time Employee Staffing, 2019  
Nationwide Cybersecurity Summary Report 
 
Another key point from the NCSR is, “Dedicated 
security staffing also correlates to higher maturity 
scores.”  78% of NCSR participants reported their 
organizations have less than five full-time security 
employees.  With a lack in security staffing, it is 
difficult to begin assessing and implementing an 
appropriate cybersecurity program. 
A survey from the International City/County 
Management Association (ICMA) found that less 
than 1% of local governments have a dedicated 
cybersecurity department or unit [9]. 
Challenges identified through the interviews 
reflected several insights that must be considered in 
the development of the model: 
• Time:  Personnel in small organizations wear 
multiple hats and should consider the amount 
of time needed for the HVA Program. Larger 
organizations will have more assets and will 
need to dedicate more time to the program. 
• Personnel: Minimal personnel, in some cases 
there are no personnel, dedicated to 
Participation volume of centralized, decentralized, or hybrid 
governance structures within the Local peer group.  Data  
collected in analyzing the 2,523 local organizations that  
participated in the 2019 NCSR. 
Summary of IT full-time employee staffing for NCSR 
participating organizations.  Data collected in analyzing the 
number of IT staff within an organization.  This data reflects all 
3,135 participants of the 2019 NCSR. 
• Organizations with 25 or more IT employees score 19% higher than 
organizations with less than 25 IT employees 
   5,000 or more  0.02% 
   1,000 to 4,999 1.0% 
   500 to 999 2.0% 
   150 to 499 4.0% 
   50 to 149 8.0% 
   25 to 49 8.0% 
   24 or less 78.0% 
How would you categorize  
your cybersecurity governance  
structure? 
         
        Centralized (1,679)           67.0% 
 
        Decentralized (178)            7.0% 
 
        Hybrid (666)            26.0% 
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information technology, risk management, 
and cybersecurity efforts.  Training for 
personnel is needed but cannot cost much. 
• Budget: A high area of concern and creative 
measures are often taken to find funding for 
IT enhancements such as not hiring unfilled 
positions to redirect funds for IT projects. 
 
Criteria Observation #2 – the model must include 
no and low cost solutions for implementation.   
Criteria Observation #3 - the model must be easy to 
understand for personnel with any level of IT 
maturity 
Criteria Observation #4 – implementation must 
have a flexible time period. 
Criteria Observation #5 – functions should be 
described (tasks that need to be accomplished) rather 
than roles as there may be limited personnel to 
accomplish the objectives. 
 
4.4 Existing HVA Program Elements 
 
Some elements needed for identification of HVAs 
may exist in established organizational plans; 
however, the DHS 2020 National Preparedness 
Report indicates that 74% of communities reported 
gaps in planning and updating cybersecurity plans, 
and 76% identified updating cybersecurity plans as 
an area of high priority. Another consideration 
referenced in this report is a large portion of cyber 
infrastructure in communities is owned and managed 
by the private sector, highlighting the dependency of 
this capability on strong stakeholder relationships—a 
functionality that challenges many communities in 
the nation. Communities also reported that they have 
relatively low confidence in their assessment of their 
current cybersecurity capabilities. Therefore, 
communities appear to recognize cyberattacks as a 
concerning threat, but they may not fully understand 
their cybersecurity capabilities [10]. 
Insights from the interviews that should be 
considered in the model are as follows: 
• No cyber integration: 
o Some of the SLTT organizations have 
risk management programs on the 
physical side but have not integrated 
cyber into it. 
o Disaster recovery, continuity and 
incident response plans are way behind 
regarding the integration of cyber. 
• HVA elements: 
o Aspects of the HVA may be included in 
the organizations Information Security 
Policy or Risk Management and existing 
processes. 
• Education/Awareness needed: 
o The business/system owners are 
responsible for categorizing assets and 
assigning them in the system of record.  
Most do not have a technical 
background. 
o Executive leadership and system owners 
may not really understand risk 
management. 
• Process involves multiple entities: 
o Information security is under the 
compliance department rather than IT. 
 
Criteria Observation #6 – a review of existing 
policies, procedures and plans for specific HVA 
related elements should be included to assist in 
identifying potential HVAs. 
Criteria Observation #7 – a compelling introduction 
should be developed and shared with nontechnical 
system owners and leadership describing the value 
proposition of including the HVA methodology into a 
cybersecurity program.   
Criteria Observation #8 – tools, templates and 
checklists should be included to simplify the overall 
process as much as possible. 
 
5. Method for Identifying HVAs 
 
Federal agencies are primarily responsible for 
designating their HVAs, however, DHS may also 
designate HVAs for an agency if the asset has the 
potential to impact national security.  OMB M-19-03 
directs each federal organization to report their non-
national security HVAs to DHS. The SLTT 
organizations interviewed, indicated that 
organizations within a state are individually 
responsible for the management and protection of 
their assets and are not required to report HVAs to 
the state.  State coordination is primarily voluntary. 
As stated previously, organizations often include 
non-technical business/system owners for 
categorizing assets and assigning them in the system 
of record. This makes it increasingly important for 
organizations to understand the need to identify 
HVAs and to have an easy to use method for 
identifying critical assets. 
Every organization has high value assets that 
require additional protective measures. A core 
activity in securing the organization’s environment is 
to identify and prioritize these high value assets. The 
first step is to determine if an asset is of high value.  
Described here are three primary areas that can be 
assessed as directed by OMB M-19-03 [11].   
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1) Informational Value - any information or 
other asset that has great value to the 
organization or its competitors.  
2) Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) – the 
information and information systems 
associated with the organizations mission.  
MEFs are those assets if unavailable, 
modified, corrupted or exposed would have a 
significant impact on the organization’s 
ability to offer its services or complete its 
mission. 
3) Protective assets – those assets used for 
security or resilience.  Security and resilience 
are not the same.  Security assets are needed 
to protect the organization from attacks and 
breaches while resilience focuses on 
continuing business operations even after an 
attack has occurred.    
Overall, an asset should be considered of high value 
if it has the potential to have an enterprise-wide 
impact.  This includes cross functional processes 
such as operations and compliance. Reputational 
damage should also be considered.  
The most important concept here is for the 
organization to recognize identifying HVAs is the 
activity of locating the organization’s most critical 
information and information systems that are 
associated with their business mission and their 
ability to provide organizational security and 
resiliency. 
 
5.1 Mission Essential Functions 
 
The first step in identifying HVAs is to analyze 
the organization’s mission and to determine what 
services and functions are essential. Essential 
services/functions are the highest priority for an 
organization to maintain, with minimal disruption, 
during all incidents or emergencies. A critical 
function is a service or a collection of services, 
normally performed by a business unit, that must 
continue at an acceptable level and without 
interruption; or the service must restart within a given 
timeframe after a disruption. An essential service or 
function will meet at least one of the following 
conditions: 
• Health and safety – A service that when not 
delivered, creates an impact on health and 
safety of individuals; preserves life, prevents 
injury, or protects property. 
• Business failure – A service that may lead to 
failure of a business unit if activities are not 
performed within a specific time period. 
• Required by law – A service that must be 
performed to satisfy regulatory requirements; 
is required by law or a regulatory authority. 
• Significant impacts – A service, if not 
performed, will significantly impact the 
business, its customers or partners.  The 
impact may be immediate or may occur over 
a period of time. 
• Critical activities with downtime 
constraints - Critical activities that cannot 
cease; activities that must be continued under 
all circumstances or cannot suffer a 
significant interruption; activities that must 
resume within a very limited amount of 
downtime. 
• Driven by mission - Activities are driven by 
mission and are identified through a business 
process. 
• Supports critical functions - Provides 
indispensable support for provision of other 
critical functions.  
• Vital support to others - Provides vital 
support to another department, unit, or 
organization (with critical functions). 
• Financial - A system that is connected to a 
major revenue source. 
There are many important and necessary 
functions, but this does not make them essential.  A 
review of the identified functions should be done to 
determine if it is essential to the business.  One way 
to make the distinction between essential or non-
essential is to determine if the function is necessary 
during a disruption and must continue during 
emergencies.  Essential functions are both important 
and urgent.  Functions that can be deferred until after 
an emergency should be considered as non-essential.   
Another way to identify MEFs is to leverage work 
that has already been done in the organization and 
documented.  As an example, organizations that have 
completed a continuity plan may have already 
identified some or all of the essential functions that 
have the potential to negatively impact the business 
due to an emergency, incident or disruption.  Other 
organizational documents that may identify MEFs 
are: 
• Business Continuity Plan (BCP) 
• Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) 
• Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) 
• Memorandum(s) of Understanding (MOUs) 
• Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
• Audit reports 
• Contracts 
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DHS published a list of validated primary mission 
essential functions by federal department or agency 
such as DHS, Department of Defense (DOD), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of 
Transportation (DOT), and Health and Human 
Services (HHS) to name a few [12].  Some of the 
essential functions listed include: 
• DHS – Screen and secure the borders; Protect 
critical infrastructure, Enforce Homeland 
Security laws 
• DOD – Formulate national defense policy; 
Protect and defend the country; Conduct 
domestic emergency response 
• DOJ – Advise and represent the President, 
Protect Senior Officials and the Courts, Fight 
Terrorism and Espionage 
• DOT – Assure defense transportation 
infrastructure; Respond to transportation 
disruptions; Operate national airspace 
systems 
• HHS – Monitor and respond to health 
challenges; Oversee safety of medical 
products; Provide medical care and services 
Many of the federal essential function examples 
do not apply to non-federal organizations.  However, 
some of them can be modified to better reflect 
essential functions that may be found in SLTT and 
private organizations. A third approach to identifying 
essential functions is for organizations to review their 
mission and match relevant essential functions from 
this modified list.  Additional functions may be added 
or those that don’t precisely match can be modified.  
The modified list of essential functions includes: 
• Manage Finances: Manage the 
organization’s finances enabling continual 
operation of essential services and 
sustaining public confidence in the 
organization’s ability to meet financial 
obligations. These may include but are not 
limited to disbursement of payments, 
collection of receipts, financial obligations 
and activities.  
• Emergency Response: Provide emergency 
response capabilities.  SLTT response may 
include law enforcement, fire, medical, and 
search and rescue services. 
• Maintain Situational Awareness: Provide 
strategic-level situational awareness, 
information sharing, and decision support to 
leadership at all levels of government for 
incidents (all threats and all hazards).  
• Coordinate Continuity and Incident 
Response: Coordinate continuity 
capabilities and manage implementation of 
incident response efforts. 
• Maintain Operational Communications: 
Ensure the continuity of operations and 
reconstitution of critical electronic 
communications systems and services. 
• Monitor and Respond to Health 
Challenges: Prepare for, mitigate, respond 
to, and recover from public health and 
medical emergencies. 
• Protect Critical Infrastructure: Provide 
security, reduce vulnerability, and ensure 
resilience of the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure and cyberspace from terrorism, 
criminal activity, and environmental hazards 
to ensure the delivery of essential services 
and functions. 
• Secure Sensitive Information: Ensure 
sensitive information such as PII, PHI, PCII, 
Law Enforcement/Investigative Information, 
and other sensitive data is available to those 
who require access and protected from 
unauthorized disclosure or modification.  
• Support other Critical Functions: Identify, 
protect and manage information and 
information systems required for another 
agency or organization’s mission essential 
function. This pertains to organization’s who 
have an essential function that is based on 
requests or assistance needed from others.  
An example would be an organization whose 
mission is to coordinate emergency actions 
after a disaster. This coordination doesn’t 
occur unless a request and information of 
what is needed is provided. 
 
5.2 Critical Assets 
 
Critical assets as mentioned previously, can also 
be any information or other asset that has great value 
to the organization, its competitors or adversaries.   
This may include but is not limited to:  
• Trade secrets, patents, copyrights 
• Financial data 
• Customer data 
• Sales information 
• Human resource information 
• Proprietary software 
• Scientific research 
• Schematics 
• Internal processes [13]   
Other assets that may be considered HVAs 
include those critical assets that may impact 
confidentiality integrity, and/or availability, and those 
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assets that provide security and/or resilience to the 
organization. In addition, interconnections and 
dependencies must be documented to recognize the 
relationships between systems.  A system that by 
itself may not be initially identified as an HVA, may 
be designated an HVA if the system is connected to 
or facilitates the operations of significantly important 
subsystems that can impact an HVA and its ability to 
perform a mission [14].  
Existing documents in the organization that may 
assist in identifying these critical assets may include: 
• Business Impact Analysis (BIA) 
• Risk Assessment Report 
• Risk Impact Assessment 
• Risk Register 
• System Security Plan (SSP) 
• Security-related policies 
• Network Diagrams 
• Data Flow Diagrams 
• Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M) 
 
6. Determining HVAs 
 
The process for identifying HVAs may involve 
system owners throughout the organization who may 
be nontechnical.  These system owners will likely be 
focused on identifying assets that are most critical for 
their role within the organization rather than 
evaluating the HVA as a critical asset for the overall 
organization.  In addition, the criteria observations 
listed earlier must be considered, recognizing the 
model must take into consideration organizations that 
may have limited or no IT capability and the process 
should be easy enough to implement no matter the IT 
maturity level of the staff completing this step.  
These considerations can be addressed by developing 
a criterion for identifying an HVA based on the 
MEFs and critical assets.  The criteria will assist 
system owners to evaluate the MEF and critical asset 
found in their area and apply a standardized method 
to assess its importance to the overall organization 
and to identify dependencies and interdependencies 
that may exist.  Prior threat assessments, risk 
assessments or audits could be used for the 
development of the criterion.  
A rationale should then be developed and 
implemented based on the unique requirements of the 
organization.  The rationale is applied to each HVA 
to determine a finalized list of HVAs that may impact 
the ability of the organization to accomplish its 
mission. The tailored rationale may include 
continuity considerations specific to the organization 
such as: 
• If access was lost, which assets or functions 
would generate the most inquiries in regard to 
when it will be reinstated? 
• How long can this asset be unavailable before 
it negatively impacts the organization’s 
ability to provide services or functions? 
• Based on the total number of personally 
identifiable information (PII) records the 
organization has, how many records does this 
asset store or process? 
• Based on threats to confidentiality, integrity 
and availability for this asset, what is the 
level of impact on the organization in the 
event of a compromise? 
• If this system or asset was compromised, 
would it adversely impact a mission essential 
function? 
• How many mission essential functions does 
this asset support?  
 
7. Prioritizing HVAs 
 
Once a comprehensive inventory list of HVAs is 
documented for the organization, a process to 
prioritize the HVAs will be needed.  The method 
used for this initiative will be focused on scoring the 
HVAs to identify the most critically important asset 
where compromise would have the most damaging 
impacts to the organization. Multiple scoring factors 
should be included in determining the highest value 
assets.  The following are potential factors that could 
be used or modified: 
• Data Type – is the data processed or stored 
by this HVA of interest to a malicious actor 
or competitor. 
• Sensitivity of Data – what level of sensitivity 
is the data processed or stored by this HVA 
o Level 0 - Available to the Public 
o Level 1 – Organization Confidential 
o Level 2 – Legal/Compliance Sensitive 
• Data Volume – what percentage of the 
organizational data is processed or stored by 
this HVA 
o 0 – 25% 
o 26 – 50% 
o 51 – 75% 
o 76 – 100% 
• Interconnections – how many systems/assets 
support this HVA 
• Dependencies – how many internal HVAs 
are supported by this HVA 
• External Dependencies – are there external 
system dependencies associated with this 
HVA 
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• Other Considerations - are there other 
considerations the organization may have to 
rank this HVA higher 
Answering each of these questions, and/or other 
questions the organization develops, with a 
numbering scheme or value, as shown above, will 
provide a standardized method for the organization to 
prioritize all HVAs within the organization.  This 
prioritized inventory of HVAs is the first step to 
enable the organization to know which assets are of 
the highest value and should have additional 
protections.  
The time allotted for this process should be 
flexible as indicated in the criteria observations. 
There needs to be ample time to go through the 
process but not too much time where the initiative 
can lose its momentum to competing priorities. 
Allocating 30 – 45 days, based on the organization’s 
schedule, allows time for the system owners to go 
through the process to identify HVAs in their 
respective areas and return a list of HVAs to a 
designated HVA program coordinator or point of 
contact.  The HVA coordinator can then reconcile the 
identified HVAs received from each system owner 
and compile a comprehensive list of HVAs that are 
then prioritized creating an inventory of HVAs for 
the organization.     
  
8. Next Steps 
 
At the completion of this process, the 
organization’s high value assets have been:  
1) Identified 
2) Examined from the organization’s 
perspective and interests 
3) Reviewed for potential threats from a 
competitor or adversary 
4) Prioritized   
5) Inventoried 
This model enables the organization to clearly 
understand the risks associated with their most 
critical assets.  Incorporating the HVA identification 
method, provides the organization with tangible and 
actionable information they can use to make more 
informed decisions and can create an action plan to 
better secure and protect those assets.  While this 
model is beneficial for all organizations, the model 
can serve the smaller communities and agencies by 
providing them with steps that can increase their 
overall awareness of their assets and assist them in 
developing a plan that is flexible enough to allow 
them to scale improvements within their budgets and 
can be accomplished with minimal personnel.  
The next steps for the organization are to assess 
the security that is already implemented for each 
HVA and to determine what additional controls 
should be integrated.  There are several sources that 
may assist an organization to select the controls 
needed for high value assets such as NIST SP 800-53 
control catalog.  More advanced controls and 
enhancements can be found in the CISA High Value 
Asset Overlay.  
 
9. Conclusion  
 
Cybersecurity is becoming more of an issue for 
states, communities and the private sector as the 
number and types of attacks that they experience are 
growing and becoming more sophisticated.  
Organizations need to have a comprehensive 
understanding of their critical assets, also called high 
value assets (HVAs), to enable them to prioritize and 
enhance their defenses against cyber-attacks.  The 
federal government has issued many directives to 
assist federal agencies to identify their HVAs in order 
to understand potential impacts to those assets from 
cyber incidents and to enable them to ensure they are 
protected.  Through these federal directives, a HVA 
Program has been developed for federal agencies 
focusing on national security. The national focus will 
not apply directly to SLTTs and small to mid-sized 
private organizations, therefore, a new model must be 
established and is described in this paper.  
The first step in identifying HVAs is to analyze 
the organization’s mission and to determine what 
services and functions are essential.  A criterion is 
established and rationale to assist the organization to 
have a standardized method to identify the mission 
essential functions and critical assets that are 
essential for the operations of the organization as a 
whole.  Once the MEFs and critical assets are 
identified, a method to prioritize them needs to be 
completed resulting in an inventory of the HVAs.  
This prioritized HVA inventory will show which 
HVAs if compromised would have the most 
damaging impact to the organization.       
Most organizations do not have a formal HVA 
process.  Formalizing the HVA model into the 
organizations governance structure will assist the 
organization to become better at maintaining 
proactive defenses, provide them with actionable 
information to make better decisions in regard to 
their most valuable assets, and better prepare the 
organization for the future.  
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